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ESSAY
ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SPIRIT
LouIs D. BILIONIS*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE EBB AND THE FLOW IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The flow of state constitutional law these days comes at a time when
judicial protection of individual liberties under the Federal Constitution
is unmistakably ebbing. No one should think the two phenomena are
unrelated.
One possible connection between the two, espoused commonly but
not exclusively by those who prefer the federal ebb to the state flow, is
suggested by what we might fairly label the "cynical" account of the
recent rise of state constitutional jurisprudence. Liberal lawyers and
state judges weaned on the judicial activism of the free-spirited Warren
Court years, the account goes, are taking no pleasure in the decisions of
an increasingly conservative United States Supreme Court and lower fed-
eral judiciary. Still retaining influence at the state level, these liberal
forces are turning to state constitutions to justify the rights-expansive
(and, critics would say, democracy-denying) results they desire.' As de-
scriptive of lawyers litigating in the constitutional field, the cynical ac-
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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1982, Harvard University. Jack Boger,
Marshall Dayan, Don Hornstein, Arnold Loewy, John Orth, and Rich Rosen provided helpful
suggestions for which I am grateful. I would also like to thank Kelvin Newsome for his re-
search assistance.
1. See, e.g., George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-
Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 987 (1979)
(charging the California Supreme Court with result-oriented adjudication under state constitu-
tion); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion
of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 434 (1974) [hereinafter Wilkes, State Court Evasion]
(positing that state courts are "anxious to evade the Supreme Court"); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr.,
More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873, 873, 894 (1975) (reiterat-
ing evasion thesis, while noting that independent state constitutional adjudication may prevent
federalism from becoming "a cliche for judicial conservatism"); see also Ronald K.L. Collins,
Foreword: The Once "New Judicial Federalism" & Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REv. 5, 6-7 (1989)
(disputing cynical criticisms of state constitutional resurgence as result-oriented); Robin B.
Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitu-
tion, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297, 297 & n.7, 299 & n.13, 300 (1977) (suggesting that critics of state
constitutional resurgence are themselves result-oriented).
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count no doubt has the ring of truth about it. The emerging new order
may not prove wholly hostile to all assertions of civil rights, but federal
assertions of such claims are surely being discouraged.2 The strategic
advantages to pleading today's civil liberties cases in state court on state
constitutional grounds are freely admitted.3
What the cynical account implies about state judges who find mean-
ing and potential in the organic law of their states is, however, difficult to
accept. The cynical account may not be totally wrong about what moti-
vates judges to act as they do. Those who go with the flow, as well as
those who cast with the ebb, sometimes do so with an enthusiasm that
makes one wonder whether the personally attractive and the legally ap-
propriate are being kept distinct.4 The problem with the cynical account
is that it leaves untold far too much of the judicial story. To most jurists,
the state constitution probably presents an unenviable obligation rather
than a hoped-for opportunity. Constitutional texts comprise a part of the
state's corpusjuris, and the court's constitutional responsibility is to con-
sider them and give them their due effect.
Another account of the rise of state constitutions, which we might
label the "structural" account, explains state judicial behavior more sat-
2. The discouragements occur at both the substantive and procedural levels of constitu-
tional adjudication. For illustrations of the narrowing of substantive rights, see Wilson v.
Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2323-24 (1991) (requiring inmate who challenges prison conditions on
Eighth Amendment grounds to prove culpable state of mind on part of state officials); Employ-
ment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880-82 (1990) (upholding
criminal law which does not have as its object the impairment of religious freedom but oper-
ates to that effect); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989) (restrict-
ig state authority to implement affirmative action measures); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 167 (1986) (interpreting narrowly prohibition against involuntary confessions; confession
is not involuntary in the absence of government coercion). For examples of the narrowing of
procedural rights, see Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758-59 (1992)
(announcing flexible standard for modifying consent decrees stemming from institutional re-
form litigation); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991) (curtailing federal
habeas corpus remedies when petitioner commits procedural default in state proceedings);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295-96 (1989) (curtailing retroactive application of federal con-
stitutional law in habeas corpus).
3. See, e.g., Kevin Cullen, Constitutional Lawyers Shift Focus from Federal to State
Courts, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 5, 1992, at 8J (noting that constitutional
advocates have turned to state courts to carry agenda). Superimposing an adversarial process
on a federal system that invites dramatic variations in law and process would seem to make
forum-shopping and law-shopping an inevitable and necessary part of zealous, professionally
responsible lawyering. Constitutional advocates certainly have not missed this point. Tradi-
tionally, they have chosen their forums with an eye toward differences in judicial predilection,
institutional capacity, and substantive and procedural opportunity. See Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1106-15 (1977).
4. The California Supreme Court's state constitutional decisions during the late 1970s
underwent the sharpest criticism of this sort. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note
1, at 987; Wilkes, State Court Evasion, supra note 1, at 436.
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isfactorily. This view begins with the premise that society relies upon
two basic forms of judicial action in its quest to realize fundamental val-
ues and cultivate a healthy political life: federal judicial interpretation
and enforcement of the United States Constitution, and state court inter-
pretation and enforcement of state constitutions.' Each is a distinct force
which helps shape our national constitutional environment. Each force,
however, is also dependent upon, limited by, and to some extent the
product of, that very same environment. Federal and state constitutions
thus are interdependent features of a greater American constitutional
structure-the web of social institutions and practices the American peo-
ple employ, sometimes unwittingly, to articulate and effectuate their
highest ideals.
Under the structural account, the federal ebb and the state flow in
American constitutional law are two manifestations of a single phenome-
non: a major realignment of the national constitutional order. The pri-
mary responsibility for defining and enforcing civil liberties is shifting
from the federal courts and the Federal Constitution to the state judiciar-
ies and their state constitutions. According to the United States Supreme
Court justices who have been instrumental in bringing about this shift,
the transformation is necessitated by structural constitutional considera-
tions implicit in "Our Federalism"6 and should not be taken as indicative
of any substantive agenda.7 What appears as federal antipathy toward
claims of individual liberty is, as it were, nothing personal, but instead a
necessary incident of the transformational process. Without the federal
ebb, there would be little impetus for the state flow.
To say that the Supreme Court rejects constitutional claims because
of the institutional concerns of "Our Federalism" is not to imply that the
Court necessarily intends the state courts to receive with Aivor the many
5. This proposition is obviously simplified, but at no detriment to the points made in the
text. Among other things, a more elaborate description of the judicial role would account for
state court adjudication of the Federal Constitution, see, e.g., Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046-54
(1977) (discussing how habeas corpus facilitates state-federal dialogue and contributes to the
development of federal constitutional doctrine), and the function of common-law powers in the
judicial enforcement of constitutional norms. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-26 (1975)
(detailing sub-constitutional nature of certain judicially created rules designed to protect or
implement constitutional values).
6. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
7. It is not uncommon for the justices to stress, in the course of rendering a restrictive
federal ruling, that their decision leaves the states free to accord more protection to individual
rights. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2612 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2519-20 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S.
Ct. 1441, 1451 (1990); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983).
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claims which are being diverted to them through this constitutional re-
alignment. As a practical matter, such a contention would be hard to
square with the evident inclinations of the justices who today make up
the Court's majority.8 As a theoretical matter, such a contention is sim-
ply unnecessary. From the structural point of view, it is not important
that the states reach particular answers, but only that they recognize
their responsibility for the questions.
As state judges assume with increasing frequency their responsibility
to make independent constitutional judgments, they discover material
distinctions between state constitutional adjudication and federal consti-
tutional adjudication that will not merely justify but in fact will compel
different answers than would be reached under the Federal Constitution.
For present purposes, the distinctions may be grouped into three general
categories.
First, the legal texts germane to state constitutional jurisprudence
often are markedly different from those that would be relevant at the
federal level. State constitutions are rich with provisions that either have
no counterpart in the federal document or speak with an emphasis or
clarity that similar federal terms lack. Many state constitutions, for in-
stance, contain explicit stipulations that the government must provide
and maintain an efficient system of public education.9 Such provisions
have enabled a number of state courts to demand the reform of inequita-
ble school financing schemes, something the United States Supreme
Court has been unwilling to require under the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
8. Those who find it impossible to credit the Court's disclaimers that no substantive
agenda is being pursued do not suggest that the hidden agenda is one to expand individual
rights. See, eg., Herman Schwartz, Trends in the Rehnquist Court, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 559,
567-74 (1991) (pointing out the Court's willingness to set aside structural concerns relating to
federalism and finality in litigation when necessary to achieve anti-affirmative action objec-
tives). But even if one accepts the Court's sincerity, it does not follow that no substantive
motivations are at play. The decision to undertake a program which has obvious and immedi-
ate substantive consequences cannot be made without at least an inner ordering of substantive
values. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional The-
ones, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-64 (1980).
9. E.g., KY. CONST. § 183 (mandating that legislature "provide for an efficient system of
common schools throughout the state"); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1) (providing that
"[e]quality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state"); N.J. CONST.
art. VIII, § 4, para. 1 (obligating legislature to "provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all children in the
State"); TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § I (requiring legislature to "establish and make suitable provi-
sion for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools").
10. Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973) (up-
holding Texas school financing system under Equal Protection Clause) with Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Tex. 1989) (invalidating Texas scheme under
state constitution). For additional examples of school systems declared unconstitutional, see
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (requiring equitable
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In North Carolina, some of the most prominent lines of state constitu-
tional authority stem from distinctive textual features of the state's Dec-
laration of Rights. The language of section 1, providing that all persons
are endowed with an "inalienable right" to "the enjoyment of the fruits
of their own labor," II forms the basis of a vibrant jurisprudence protec-
tive of individual economic liberty-a Lochner-like2 economic due pro-
cess with text to back it up.13 The plain prohibition against the exclusion
school financing system under state constitution); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236
Mont. 44, 54-55, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (1989) (same); Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 384-85, 575
A.2d 359, 408 (1990) (same).
The North Carolina Constitution contains several provisions which speak to a fundamen-
tal right to public education. Article I, § 15, for example, provides that "[t]he people have a
right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that
right." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15. Article IX, § 1 states that "schools, libraries, and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged." Id. art. IX, § 1. And under Article IX, § 2(1),
"tihe General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform
system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and
wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students." Id. art. IX, § 2(l). It has been
held, however, that these provisions do not prohibit educational inequities between public
schools in poorer counties and those in counties with higher tax bases. Britt v. North Carolina
State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 289, 357 S.E.2d 432, 436, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C.
790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
11. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1. Though the provision has an obvious federal antecedent in
the American Declaration of Independence, see State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 768, 51
S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949), it has no textual counterpart in the United States Constitution.
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). Lochner and its progeny held that the
general guarantee of due process implied a substantive prohibition against legislative and regu-
latory measures that substantially interfere with the right of individuals to enter freely into
contract. The doctrine was repudiated in 1937 with the decision in West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379, 390-400 (1937). See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 8-2 to -7 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the rise and fall of substantive due process associ-
ated with Lochner).
13. See In re Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 551, 193 S.E.2d 729, 735-36 (1973)
(invalidating legislation prohibiting hospital construction without certificate of need); Roller v.
Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 526, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (1957) (invalidating legislation requiring licens-
ing of tile layers); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 772, 51 S.E.2d 731, 736 (1949) (invalidating
legislation requiring licensing of photographers), overruling State v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674,
197 S.E. 586 (1938); Palmer v. Smith, 229 N.C. 612, 616, 51 S.E.2d 8, 11-12 (1948) (invalidat-
ing legislation forbidding optician from duplicating and replacing optical lens without pre-
scription); State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 765, 6 S.E.2d 854, 866 (1940) (invalidating legislation
requiring licensing of dry cleaners).
Many states enjoy a similar state constitutional tradition of heightened judicial scrutiny of
restrictions upon economic liberty. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive
Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91, 117-18 (1950) (discussing continuation by
state courts of substantive due process review of economic legislation after post-Lochner fed-
eral retreat, and expressing skepticism of such judicial review under democratic principles);
John A. Hoskins & David A. Katz, Comment, Substantive Due Process in the States Revisited,
18 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 401 (1957) (same); Note, Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law,
15 STAN. L. REv. 309, 326-30 (1963) (defending state practices). Indeed, economic due pro-
cess scrutiny under state constitutions remains a vital force today. See James C. Kirby, Jr.,
Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions: The Case for
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of any person from jury service "on account of sex, race, color, religion,
or national origin" found in section twenty-six14 is generating a signifi-
cant body of law recognizing a special judicial duty to ensure the integ-
rity of court procedures against charges of unlawful discrimination."5
Other distinctive provisions await the attention of the courts and
litigants. 6
Second, the constitutionally significant facts may be different at the
state and federal levels. Even when the state and Federal Constitutions
contain the same language and employ the same methodology to govern
the interpretation and application of that language, the ultimate constitu-
tional decision often will turn upon a factual assessment of how society
feels about certain matters or how society functions under various condi-
Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241, 252-61, 269-72 (1981) (discussing recent practices); Develop-
ments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324,
1465-72 (1982) (same).
14. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26. Federal equal protection principles go far in condemning
discrimination injury selection, but lack of plain language banning such practices has admitted
room for differences of opinion over the full reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991) (invalidating racially dis-
criminatory peremptory challenge by private civil litigant) with id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that state action is lacking); compare Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373
(1991) (granting standing to every criminal defendant, regardless of race, to object to racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges by prosecutor) with id. at 1374 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing against such standing); compare Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95-96 (1986) (per-
mitting defendant to establish unconstitutionally discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
by relying solely on facts concerning use of challenges in the case in question) with Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227-28 (1965) (requiring defendant to demonstrate consistent discrim-
inatory use of peremptory challenges by prosecution in run of cases in order to establish consti-
tutional violation), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
15. The seminal decision is State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 309, 357 S.E.2d 622, 629 (1987)
(Cofield 1) (granting new trial for discrimination in selection of grand jury foreperson). See
also State v. Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 464, 379 S.E.2d 834, 841 (1989) (Cofield II) (same); Jack-
son v. Housing Auth., 321 N.C. 584, 585, 364 S.E.2d 416, 416 (1988) (prohibiting discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges in civil actions). A recent analysis suggests that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has far to go before its performance in jury discrimination
cases will begin to approximate the force of its anti-discrimination rhetoric. See Paul H.
Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v.
Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1533, 1577 (1991).
16. Two prominent examples are N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18 ("All courts shall be open;
every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have rem-
edy by due course of law[.") and N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27 ("nor cruel or unusual punishments
inflicted"). Justice Harry C. Martin has left the bench and bar with suggestions on the direc-
tion which adjudication of these provisions might take. See Medley v. North Carolina Dep't of
Correction, 330 N.C. 837, 846, 412 S.E.2d 654, 660 (1992) (Martin, J., concurring) (suggesting
that state ban against "cruel or unusual punishments" is more protective than the federal
Eighth Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments;" state provision's use of
the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive argues for broader scope); Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.,
316 N.C. 489, 495, 342 S.E.2d 882, 887 (1986) (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that parent-
child immunity should be abrogated because § 18 "mandates that children should have a rem-
edy against their negligent parents").
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tions.17 Resolution of a search and seizure issue, for example, may turn
on whether a claimed expectation of privacy is "one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable,' ,18 or a cruel and unusual punishment
challenge upon whether a sentencing practice offends society's "evolving
standards of decency."19 In each instance it could matter greatly which
society you are talking about: a privacy claim lacking the national con-
sensus necessary to trigger federal constitutional protection might still
enjoy local support strong enough to dictate state constitutional protec-
tion;20 a sentencing practice might abridge the moral consensus that has
evolved at the state but not the national level.21 Similarly, perceived
practical difficulties with a federal constitutional rule as it has operated
around the nation might lead to its modification or abandonment,
whereas the same rule might merit retention as a state constitutional
proposition for want of demonstrated problems locally.22 Indeed, when-
ever a constitutional methodology admits a need to accommodate institu-
tional considerations, the possibility for different yet equally correct state
and federal results exists. The institutional concerns that weigh in the
federal constitutional balance rarely if ever equate precisely with those of
a state court adjudicating a constitution that will be enforced only within
the state's borders.23
17. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 952-59 (1955)
(discussing function of so-called "legislative facts" in judicial decisionmaking).
18. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. E.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-69 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
20. Compare People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815-16 (Colo. 1985) (finding privacy right
against tracking device) with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711-13 (1984) (refusing to
find same); compare People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141-43 (Colo. 1983) (finding privacy
right in telephone numbers dialed) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (re-
fusing to find same); compare Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 100, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120-
21 (1980) (finding privacy right in records held by bank) with United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 441-43 (1976) (refusing to find same); compare State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 225, 576
A.2d 793, 815 (1990) (finding privacy right in trash set out for collection) with California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (refusing to find same).
21. Compare Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 687, 386 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1989) (forbidding
execution of mentally retarded defendant under state constitution) with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (refusing to do same under Federal Constitution).
22. Compare State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (1989) (finding no
signs that the formulation for assessing probable cause based upon informant tips set forth in
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414
(1969), has proved unworkable locally, and thus adhering to the standard as a matter of state
constitutional law) and State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989) (same) with Illi-
nois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31, 238 (1983) (abandoning approach of Aguilar and Spinelli
under Federal Constitution as unnecessarily complex).
23. Federalism concerns loom particularly large in the typical federal equation. The
United States Supreme Court is ever mindful that its rulings apply throughout the land, and
accordingly they must be sensitive to the disparities in local needs and local conditions from
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Third, the constitutional spirit which pervades adjudication may be
different at the state and federal levels. A court must make innumerable
judgments in the course of expounding a constitution; the spirit with
which it approaches constitutional texts, constitutional traditions, and
the institutional implications of constitutional adjudication will leave a
mark on those judgments, on the structure of the enterprise as a whole,
and on the jurisprudence that is ultimately produced. In any jurisdic-
tion, certain views regarding the proprieties and possibilities of judicial
review will have more currency than others, and they will dictate a pre-
vailing spirit that animates constitutional adjudication and informs judi-
cial judgment. No inherent reason requires that a state's hopes and fears
about constitutional adjudication must correspond to those that happen
to move a majority of the United States Supreme Court. To the con-
trary, under the federalism that is driving America's constitutional trans-
formation, state-by-state differences signal that the system is functioning
as it should. For federalism's potential to be fulfilled, each state should
be free to follow its own instincts and bring to its constitutional analysis
that spirit which best fits its history, its traditions, and its needs.
The significance of constitutional spirit for today's constitutional ju-
risprudence deserves considerably more attention than a single article-
and certainly an essay of this nature-can extend. A short excursion into
some of its dimensions, however, is both possible and profitable.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SPIRIT AND THE NECESSITY FOR "A
FREQUENT RECURRENCE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES"
Article I, section 35 of the North Carolina Constitution provides a
fitting point of departure for this brief exploration of constitutional spirit.
The penultimate provision of the state's Declaration of Rights, this in-
triguing clause states that a "frequent recurrence to fundamental princi-
ples is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty."24 This
language has been a part of North Carolina's written fundamental law
since the beginning. The North Carolinians who met in Congress at Hal-
ifax in 1776, probably borrowing from the recently adopted Penn-
sylvania25 and Virginia26 constitutions, thought enough of its message to
state to state and respectful of the need for and the virtues of diversity. For a classic statement
of the point, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
24. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.
25. Section XIV of the Pennsylvania Constitution, completed on September 28, 1776 (six
weeks before the framers of North Carolina's Constitution convened at Halifax), stated:
That a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to jus-
tice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to pre-
1810 [Vol. 70
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include the provision in the state's original constitution.27 Over the
years, the clause has been carried forth essentially intact.2"
The central concept embodied in section 35 has appealed to consti-
tutional drafters elsewhere. Eleven other states and at least one Native
American community currently have constitutional provisions proclaim-
ing the importance of a "frequent recurrence to fundamental principles,"
although in each instance the clause in question contains qualifications or
embellishments not found in North Carolina's version.29 While some
variations in wording may be set aside as fairly minor,30 three particular
serve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free: The people ought
therefore to pay particular attention to these points in the choice of officers and rep-
resentatives, and have a right to exact a due and constant regard of them, from their
legislators and magistrates, in the making and executing such laws as are necessary
for the good government of the state.
PA. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania,
§ XIV. When Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution in 1790, the provision was omitted.
26. Section 15 of the Virginia Constitution's Bill of Rights, adopted on June 12, 1776 (five
months before the Halifax Congress convened), stated "[t]hat no free government, nor the
blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, modera-
tion, temperance, frugality, and virtue; by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." VA.
CONST. of 1776, Virginia Bill of Rights, § 15. The provision now appears at VA. CONST. art.
1, § 15.
27. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § XXI. The Halifax Provincial Congress
convened on November 12, 1776, ratified the Declaration of Rights on December 17, 1776,
and ratified the remainder of the state's constitution on the following day. 10 COLONIAL
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 913, 973-74 (William L. Saunders ed., Raleigh, N.C., J. Dan-
iels, 1890). One scholar has noted the influence of other state constitutions, including those of
Pennsylvania and Maryland, on the framers of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776. See
John V. Orth, "Fundamental Principles" in North Carolina Constitutional History, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1357, 1358 (1990).
William Hooper, one of North Carolina's delegates to the Continental Congress in Phila-
delphia, also impressed upon those who convened at Halifax the importance of a frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles. In a letter to the delegates at Halifax which stressed
popular sovereignty and the separation of powers, Hooper wrote that "it is necessary that
recurrence should often be had to original principles to prevent those evils which in a course of
years must creep in and vitiate every human institution and by insensible gradations at length
steal upon the Understanding as part of the original system." 10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF
NORTH CAROLINA, supra, at 862, 867.
28. In 1776, the provision read: "That a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty." N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of
Rights, § XXI. In the Constitution of 1868, the word "that" was deleted and the provision
was renumbered to appear as § 29. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 29. In 1971, renumbering
placed the provision where it is now found as § 35. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.
29. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 23; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art.
XVIII; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 38; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 27; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 27; VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. 18; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 32; W. VA. CONST. art.
3, § 20; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 22; GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY CONST. art. IV.
30. The constitutions of Arizona, Utah, Washington, and the Gila River Indian Commu-
nity of Arizona, for instance, consider a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles "essen-
tial to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government," ARIZ. CONST.
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distinctions merit noting. First, some states have "expanded" provisions,
clauses which supplement the "frequent recurrence to fundamental prin-
ciples" formulation with a catalogue of additional social qualities-jus-
tice, moderation, temperance, virtue, frugality, and industry being
typical-to which firm adherence also is demanded.31 Second, a few
states with expanded provisions also explicitly recognize a "right" of the
people to expect strict observance of fundamental principles and social
qualities from their legislative and judicial officials.32 Third, some states
include language detailing the virtues expected of private citizens in their
political affairs, and perhaps their social affairs as well.33
The differences in the provisions can be meaningful, but we may
pass over them in this Cook's tour to focus upon the concept which
forms their core and which North Carolina's section 35 sets out with
unadorned clarity-the necessity for a "frequent recurrence to funda-
mental principles." It has been said that these words on their face natu-
rally suggest "not so much a specific legally-enforceable duty as a
constitutional attitude, ' 34 and that in fact is how the words have figured
art. 2, § 1; UTAH CoNsT. art. 1, § 27; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 32; GILA RIVER INDIAN COM-
MuNrrY CONST. art. IV, whereas in North Carolina it is "absolutely necessary to secure the
blessings of liberty," N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.
31. Seven states have such expanded provisions. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVIII; N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 38; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 27; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 18; VA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 15; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 20; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
32. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVIII ("[Tihey have a right to require of their lawgivers and
magistrates, an exact and constant observance of them, in the formation and execution of the
laws necessary for the good administration of the Commonwealth."); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art.
38 ("[T]hey have a right to require of their law-givers and magistrates, an exact and constant
observance of them, in the formation and execution of the laws necessary for the good adminis-
tration of government."); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 18 ("[The people ... have a right, in a legal
way, to exact a due and constant regard to them, from their legislators and magistrates, in
making and executing such laws as are necessary for the good government of the State.").
Explicit textual declaration of such a right does not mean that courts will make the right
judicially enforceable. See State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 15, 480 A.2d 854, 862 (1984) (Souter,
J.) (suggesting that New Hampshire's provision is merely advisory or admonishing).
33. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 23 ("The blessings [of liberty] cannot endure unless the people
recognize their corresponding individual obligations and responsibilities."); MASS. CONST. Pt.
1, art. XVIII ("The people ought, consequently, to have a particular attention to all those
principles, in the choice of their officers and representatives .... "); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 38
("[T]he people ought, therefore, to have a particular regard to all those principles in the choice
of their officers and representatives .... ."); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 18 ("[The people ought,
therefore to pay particular attention to these points, in the choice of officers and representa-
tives .... ); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (calling for "the recognition by all citizens that they have
duties as well as rights, and that such rights cannot be enjoyed save in a society where law is
respected and due process is observed"). Cf. Corm v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C.
761, 787-88, 413 S.E.2d 276, 292-93 (1991) (relying on N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35, which con-
tains no references to private citizens, to support position that Declaration of Rights only
creates rights against state officials acting in their official capacity).
34. Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review
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in the practice of state constitutional adjudication over the years. State
justices have employed the principle of "frequent recurrence" in a
number of judicial opinions, but not as a direct source of substantive
legal doctrine. The principle has operated instead in the interstices of
constitutional analysis, where judges make pivotal choices about the
reach of individual constitutional rights and about the proper role of the
judiciary in enforcing those rights in a democratic society.35 In these
analytical lacunae, rights-bestowing texts and precedents lose their power
to dictate results, that elusive quality of judgment bears directly on deci-
sionmaking, and, accordingly, a jurist's sense of constitutional spirit has
its most pronounced impact.
Judges turn to diverse corners for a sense of the constitutional spirit
that can appropriately inform their exercise of judgment. For some, the
needed guidance comes from the popular theorizings of the academy 36 or
even, it has been suggested, from the memory of lessons imparted at the
judge's childhood "dinner table forum."' 37 Others find inspiration in a
clause like section 35-which, unlike the sources just mentioned, has the
founders' authorship, the people's ratification, and textual respectability
unequivocally commending it. One might add to that list of credentials
consistent judicial interpretation, for the "frequent recurrence to funda-
mental principles" language has met with a uniformity in reading that is
perhaps surprising given its breadth.
Courts agree that the phrase aims primarily to engender an unwa-
vering reverence for individual rights. The clause stands as a "solemn
warning" from the constitutional framers, who wished their descendants
Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 13, 46 (1988) (com-
menting on similar language in VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 18).
35. Professor Lawrence Sager refers to it as the strategic space between constitutional
norms and the constitutional rules which a court promulgates to effectuate those norms-
analytical space where institutional considerations that argue for restraint may influence the
formulation of the rule. Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space
Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 959, 961-73 (1985)
[hereinafter Sager, Strategic Space]; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1213-28 (1978) [here-
inafter Sager, Fair Measure] (developing thesis that institutional considerations prompt courts
to define constitutional rules narrowly, thereby underenforcing constitutional norms).
36. James Bradley Thayer's theory of judicial restraint, see James B. Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1893), doubt-
less has had the greatest impact. Three giants-Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter--"carried
its influence with them to the Bench." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 35 (1962).
37. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J.
1297, 1317 (1990) (speculating about influence of the justice's father-a professor of romance
literature-and the justice's Roman Catholic upbringing on his attitude toward constitutional
law).
1813
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
never to forget that past generations struggled dearly to secure the indi-
vidual rights adumbrated in the state constitution.38 During his tenure
on North Carolina's high court, Justice Sam J. Ervin, Jr. expressed viv-
idly this state's perspective on the matter:
During the past 172 years, the organic law of this State has
contained the solemn warning that "a frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the
blessings of liberty." When the representatives of the people of
North Carolina assembled in Congress at Halifax on November
12, 1776, for the express purpose of framing a Constitution,
they possessed an acute awareness of the long and bitter strug-
gle of the English speaking race for some substantial measure of
dignity and freedom for the individual. They loved liberty and
loathed tyranny, and were convinced that government itself
must be compelled to respect the inherent rights of the individ-
ual if freedom is to be preserved and oppression is to be pre-
vented. In consequence, they inserted in the basic law a
declaration of rights designed chiefly to protect the individual
from the State. When it rewrote the fundamental law, the Con-
vention of 1868 retained these provisions and incorporated
them and certain other guaranties of personal liberty in the
First Article of the present State Constitution, which like its
counterpart in the Constitution of 1776 is designated a "Decla-
ration of Rights.
'3 9
Judges have interpreted this. admonition from our forebears as im-
plying an obligation as well: the living must fight spiritedly to preserve
what their ancestors fought so heroically to obtain. It is thus that Justice
Harry C. Martin, writing recently for the North Carolina Supreme Court
38. See State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 768, 51 S.E.2d 731, 733-34 (1949) (interpreting
provision as "solemn warning"); see also Priestly v. State, 19 Ariz. 371, 374, 171 P. 137, 138
(1918) (interpreting provision as "admonition" which cautions against "fritter[ing a right]
away in exposition"); People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 52, 81 N.E.2d 581, 596 (1948) (inter-
preting provision as "admonition" of which the court is "ever mindful"); State v. Elbert, 125
N.H. 1, 15, 480 A.2d 854, 862 (1984) (interpreting provision as admonition); State v. Bridges,
231 N.C. 163, 166, 56 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1949) (Ervin, J., dissenting) ("ancient admonition of
our organic law"); Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 359, 350 S.E.2d
365, 374 (1986) ("solemn admonition" and "directive"), aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783
(1987); Cady v. Lang, 95 Vt. 287, 294, 115 A. 140, 142 (1921) (interpreting provision as "ad.
monition" which reveals "the wisdom of our forefathers ...for the guidance of ages to
come"); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 407, 348 P.2d 664, 668 (1960) (inter-
preting provision as reflecting "advice of the framers" which the court must heed); Cooper v.
Gwinn, 171 W. Va. 245, 248, 298 S.E.2d 781, 784 (1981) (interpreting provision as admonition
and noting that court is sworn to be mindful of it); Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 541, 407
N.W.2d 832, 852-53 (1987) (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[F]ramers exhorted posterity... [because they] were deeply committed to the protection of
individual rights ....").
39. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 768, 51 S.E.2d at 733-34 (citations omitted).
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in the celebrated Corum case," could observe with fidelity to precedent
that "[w]e give our Constitution a liberal interpretation in favor of its
citizens with respect to those provisions which were designed to safe-
guard the liberty and security of the citizens in regard to both person and
property."41 At least since State v. Harris,42 a 1940 decision that Justice
Martin cited in Corum, North Carolina's constitutional rhetoric has in-
sisted that individual rights must be read broadly and enforced vigor-
ously by the courts.43 Only in that way may we prevent a gradual
erosion of our rights and maintain the tradition of the Declaration of
Rights reflected in section 35. Other jurisdictions similarly have regarded
generosity in interpreting and enforcing individual rights as a logical co-
rollary of the textual call for "frequent recurrence," although not neces-
sarily making the point with the emphasis displayed in the North
Carolina cases."
40. Comm v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).
41. Id. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290. For detailed discussions of Corum, see Harry C. Mar-
tin, The States as a "Font of Individual Liberties": North Carolina Accepts the Challenge, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1756-57 (1992), and John D. Boutwell, Note, The Cause of Action for
Damages Under North Carolina's Constitution: Corum v. University of North Carolina, 70
N.C. L. REv. 1899, 1899-1915 (1992).
42. 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940). In Harris, the court set aside legislation which
required the licensing of all dry cleaners, touching off the modem state constitutional doctrine
of economic due process. Id. at 765, 6 S.E.2d at 866; see supra note 13.
43. Harris, 216 N.C. at 762-65, 6 S.E.2d at 865-66. Several North Carolina opinions since
Harris explicitly or implicitly have summoned forth the precept that individual rights are to be
interpreted broadly. See, eg., Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 510, 385 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1989)
(positing that the "great ordinances" of the state constitution merit liberal interpretation, in
contrast to provisions of a structural nature); Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 187-88,
347 S.E.2d 743, 752 (1986) (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing § 35
and positing fundamental right of married couples to plan their families and, accordingly, to
receive damages for breach of contract to provide effective contraception); In re Crutchfield,
289 N.C. 597, 608, 223 S.E.2d 822, 828 (1975) (Lake, J., dissenting) (citing § 35 and positing
broader due process rights for judge charged with misconduct); Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31,
38, 134 S.E.2d 186, 192 (1964) (citing Harris squarely for proposition); State v. Bridges, 231
N.C. 163, 166, 56 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1949) (Ervin, J., dissenting) (citing § 35 and arguing for
broader protection at trial for criminal defendant); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51
S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949) ("These fundamental guaranties are very broad in scope, and are in-
tended to secure to each person subject to the jurisdiction of the State extensive individual
rights, including that of personal liberty.").
44. When state courts invoke the "frequent recurrence" principle, they almost invariably
do so to support a charitable interpretation of constitutional rights or a vigorous judicial re-
view of government action impacting adversely upon individual interests. See, e.g., Priestly v.
State, 19 Ariz. 371, 374, 171 P. 137, 138 (1918) (interpreting principle as cautioning against
"fritter[ing a right] away in exposition"); Commissioners of Union Drainage Dist. No. 1 v.
Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 425, 84 N.E. 376, 378 (1908) (citing principle in course of invalidating
legislation which denies individual judicial determination by an impartial tribunal); Wice v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 193 Ill. 351, 358, 61 N.E. 1084, 1087 (1901) (citing principle for proposi-
tion that "[flundamental principles secured by fundamental laws of the state cannot be de-
parted from with safety, especially those affecting personal liberty"); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364,
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Judicial review which proceeds from a premise so protective of indi-
vidual rights will not comport with everyone's idea of democracy, since it
can lead to judicial invalidation of the choices made by the people's rep-
resentatives, the legislature, in the name of the people themselves. But as
a revealing passage from Harris explains, it is compatible with the kind of
democracy envisioned by many state constitutions, North Carolina's
included:
The admonition of the Constitution requiring frequent re-
currence to fundamental principles is politically sound. Only in
this way may we avoid a break with tradition that preserves the
spirit, and often the letter of the law.
1372 (Utah 1982) (citing principle in course of articulating unenumerated fundamental right in
family relationships); Cady v. Lang, 95 Vt. 287, 293, 115 A. 140, 142 (1921) (citing principle in
support of broad interpretation of statutes designed to implement fundamental right to fair
trial by impartial judge); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400,407, 348 P.2d 664, 668
(1960) (citing principle to support liberal interpretation of individual rights that reacts flexibly
to changes in technology; holding that low airplane flights constitute taking of property); State
ex rel. McFerran v. Justice Court of Evangeline Starr, 32 Wash. 2d 544, 548, 202 P.2d 927, 929
(1949) (relying upon principle in holding that judicial officer possesses inherent power to order
change of venue needed to ensure that individual receives fair trial before impartial tribunal);
State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 112-13, 110 P. 1020, 1021 (1910) (relying upon principle to
invalidate legislation abrogating insanity defense); Graf v. Frame, 177 W. Va. 282, 286-90, 352
S.E.2d 31, 35-39 (1986) (relying upon principle in support of issuance of mandamus to prohibit
state officer from acting when conflict of interest exists); Cooper v. Gwinn, 171 W. Va. 245,
248, 298 S.E.2d 781, 784 (1981) (citing principle in support of conclusion that inmates have
right to rehabilitation and are entitled to writ of mandamus to enforce the right).
As might be predicted, the frequent recurrence principle has been popular with judges
who write separately in dissent or in concurrence to note that they would have preferred a
broader interpretation of individual rights. See Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wash. 2d 795, 800-01,
322 P.2d 125, 129 (1958) (Finley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguilg for
plaintiff's right to recover damages for pain and suffering); City of Bremerton v. Smith, 31
Wash. 2d 788, 800, 199 P.2d 95, 101 (1948) (Simpson, J., dissenting) (arguing for broader
protection against search and seizure); Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington Water Power
Co., 20 Wash. 2d 384, 407, 147 P.2d 923, 934 (1944) (Simpson, C.J., dissenting) (arguing for
broader protection against interested jurors); State v. McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d 85, 96, 136 P.2d
165, 170 (1943) (Millard, J., dissenting) (arguing for broader protection against search and
seizure); S & W Fine Foods, Inc. v. Retail Delivery Drivers Union, Local No. 353, 11 Wash.
2d 262, 278, 118 P.2d 962, 969 (1941) (Robinson, C.J., concurring) (arguing that rights of
laborers should be protected; would affirm injunction against labor picketing); State v.
Broadnax, 25 Wash. App. 704, 722, 612 P.2d 391, 399 (1980) (Ringold, J., dissenting) (arguing
for broader protection against search and seizure); Delp v. Itmann Coal Co., 176 W. Va. 252,
256-57, 342 S.E.2d 219, 223-24 (1986) (McGraw, J., dissenting) (believing that directed verdict
was erroneous, and that fundamental right to jury trial was thus abridged); Jacobs v. Major,
139 Wis. 2d 492, 541, 407 N.W.2d 832, 852-53 (1987) (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing for constitutional protection of political speech reasonably exer-
cised in a non-governmental "public forum"); State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 221, 401
N.W.2d 771, 781 (1987) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (arguing for suppression of confession
obtained from defendant who is uninformed by police that his attorney is seeking to consult
him).
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We violate no precedent by referring to the important
function these guaranties of personal liberty perform in deter-
mining the form and character of our government. They are
not accidental or unrelated. They fall into the pattern of de-
mocracy upon which our institutions are founded. In no other
part of the fundamental law is so well caught and held the aspi-
ration for this sort of freedom. If those whose duty it is to up-
hold tradition falter in the task, these guaranties may be
defeated temporarily, or permanently lost through obsoles-
cence. But it is idle to hope that the superstructure will survive
its foundation stones.45
The textual demand for "frequent recurrence to fundamental princi-
ples" is thus an expression of the spirit of the state constitution which
contains it, worthy of the serious attention of every judge who hopes to
imbue her judgment with a true sense of that spirit. As they endeavor to
capture that spirit, today's judges may benefit from the record left by
their predecessors. Judges of earlier eras harkened to the principle of
"frequent recurrence" for insight, and found within it a discrete and co-
gent vision of individual rights and the role which judges should play in
their interpretation and enforcement. As the Harris court perceived, the
rights enshrined in the state constitution need not be regarded as anoma-
lies deemed necessary to check against the potential occasional excesses
of a generally satisfactory preexisting democratic political system. In
keeping with the spirit of the framers, those rights may better be viewed
as the "foundation stones" upon which the political "superstructure" is
built.46 A court intent on doing full justice to the foundational stature of
state constitutional rights-ahas less reason to fear, and indeed has many
more reasons to find attractive, a presumption of generous interpretation
and unfailing enforcement of individual rights. Today, as ever, "it is idle
to hope that the superstructure will survive its foundation stones."'47
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SPIRIT AND SKEPTICISM FOR THE
FASHIONABLE
Of course, too much can be made of the explicit constitutional man-
date for "frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." A clause so
spacious can be irresistibly attractive to the vagabonds of constitutional
law-those various theories which, while differing in degree of extrava-
45. Harris, 216 N.C. at 762-63, 6 S.E.2d at 865-66.
46. Id. at 763, 6 S.E.2d at 866.
47. Id. This point has particular poignancy in North Carolina, where ratification of the
Declaration of Rights occurred before ratification of the provisions establishing the structure
of government. See Orth, supra note 27, at 1359; supra note 27.
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gance, all seem to search for, rather than proceed from, a text to call
home. All who would lay claim to provisions like section 35 must exer-
cise restraint and good sense, lest (witness the fate of the Ninth Amend-
ment4") these clauses pass into the purgatory reserved for principles that
the courts do not trust themselves to handle responsibly.49
Any attempt to saddle the "frequent recurrence" principle with a
weight greater than its language and judicial interpretation readily can
bear deserves to be met with a raised eyebrow. By the same token, how-
ever, demurral is also in order whenever the "frequent recurrence" prin-
ciple receives less than its fair due. Therein may lie the real power of the
ancient admonition for state constitutional jurisprudence's immediate fu-
ture. For even if the solemn warning of our forebears is heeded only
modestly, it counsels courts to apply a healthy dose of skepticism to any
measure which threatens to erode individual rights. That may be just
48. It would be a shame to pass up this chance to recall John Hart Ely's quip:
The Ninth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, provides that
"[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." Occasionally, a commentator will
express a willingness to read it for what it seems to say, but this has been, and re-
mains, a distinctly minority impulse. In sophisticated legal circles mentioning the
Ninth Amendment is a surefire way to get a laugh. ("What are you planning to rely
on to support that argument, Lester, the Ninth Amendment?") The joke is some-
what elusive. It's true that read for what it says the Ninth Amendment seems open-
textured enough to support almost anything one might wish to argue, and that
thought can get pretty scary.
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 34 (1980). But see Thomas B. McAffee, The
Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1215-18, 1314-20
(1990) (discussing revived scholarly interest in Ninth Amendment).
49. Four commentators recently have pointed to the "frequent recurrence" principle to
fortify a thesis. Each seems to have cited the principle with a modicum of temerity, using it to
accentuate propositions supported primarily by other principles. See Philip P. Houle, Eminent
Domain, Police Power, and Business Regulation: Economic Liberty and the Constitution, 92 W.
VA. L. REV. 51, 122 (1989) (citing N.C. CONT. art. I, § 35 to accent importance of judicial
review, and arguing for greater constitutional protection of economic liberty, consistent with
earlier constitutional tradition); David M. Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State Ac-
tion"Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221, 276-77
(1985) (citing WASH. CONT. art. I, § 32 in support of proposition that government is estab-
lished to maintain individual liberty, and arguing for affirmative state action to protect consti-
tutional liberty against private infringement); Teachout, supra note 34, at 46-47 (citing
"moderation" language of VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 18, in support of plea for caution in judicial
review; the provision admonishes government agencies, including the courts, to proceed with
regard for "the values of balance, proportion, and restraint"); Sanford E. Pitler, Note, The
Origin and Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right
and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REV. 459, 509 n.259, 522 n.325 (1986)
(citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32 to underscore the importance of liberal interpretation of
enumerated rights to guard against their gradual depreciation, and arguing for a protective
state constitutional exclusionary rule).
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enough to save state constitutional law from the seductive entreaties fac-
ing it in the years ahead.
Many of those who delight in the substantive outcomes associated
with the ebb of federal constitutional law are not likely to watch idly as
their victories wash away in a flow of state constitutional law. They
doubtless will heighten their efforts to have state courts follow the federal
suit; to that end they will strive to import into state constitutional juris-
prudence the conservative constitutional strategies currently popular in
federal judicial circles. For any number of reasons-including the theo-
retical or ideological appeal of the methodology in question, the in-
grained sense of federal superiority in all matters constitutional, the idea
that uniformity is a virtue, or (dare it be admitted) the judicial reluctance
to be cast as a liberal maverick before the state electorate-the tempta-
tion to acquiesce can be strong.
The state judge who draws strength from the spirit of a provision
like North Carolina's section 35, however, cannot help but be sensitive to
one feature of some of the more fashionable federal strategies which
makes them easier to resist from a state constitutional standpoint. The
salient shortcoming of these federal strategies when applied in a state
constitutional context is not that they serve the agenda of political con-
servatives-although they do-but that they are founded on a premise
that is antithetical to the philosophy of "frequent recurrence." Whereas
a clause like section 35 advises that judgments in the interstices of consti-
tutional analysis should be resolved in favor of broader definition and
protection of individual rights, currently prevalent federal methodologies
often reflect the contrary view that it is better to err on the side of under-
stating the reach of an individual right and underenforcing the right's
potential.5 0
The inclination toward understatement and underenforcement is ev-
ident in the United States Supreme Court's dealings with the rights of the
criminally accused. To their credit, the justices have been reasonably
charitable toward Bill of Rights guarantees when doing so serves the fun-
damental due process objective of securing an accurate resolution of the
factual dispute between the government and a defendant (an uncon-
troversial goal shared by law-and-order proponents and civil libertarians
alike).5 But criminal procedure rights often have other dimensions.
50. The dynamics of judicial understatement and underenforcement of constitutional
principles are cogently explored and aptly illustrated in Professor Lawrence Sager's work. See
Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 35, at 1213-28; Sager, Strategic Space, supra note 35, at 961-
73.
51. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1992) (reaffirming, by 7-2 vote, that
unreliable hearsay evidence is objectionable on Confrontation Clause grounds); Cage v. Louisi-
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Some, like the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel 2 and to a speedy
trial,5 3 promote values in addition to accuracy, while others, such as the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule 4 and the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination, 55 rest primarily, if not entirely, upon
considerations independent of the quest for truth. The Court's conserva-
tive majority has shown little solicitude for the non-accuracy residuum of
criminal procedure rights, adopting three basic strategies for reducing
and confining that residuum. Non-accuracy values are dismissed
through interpretation5 6  depreciated through doctrinal structuring
designed to permit accuracy concerns to control,57 and isolated so that
ana, 111 S. Ct. 328, 329-30 (1990) (per curiam) (finding unanimously that reasonable doubt
instruction erroneously lessened state's burden of proof); Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227,
231-32 (1988) (per curiam) (holding, by 8-1 vote, Confrontation Clause violated where trial
court excluded evidence highly probative of rape complainant's bias after discretionary deter-
mination that prejudice to complainant outweighed probative value); Skipper v. South Caro-
lina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (recognizing unanimously that capital defendant has due process
right to offer evidence relevant to rebut state's showing of aggravating circumstances at
sentencing).
52. See, eg., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 645-46 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that right to counsel serves "to assure some modicum of
equality"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (not-
ing counsel's function in securing fairness in process); Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court
and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9,95 (1986)
("Effective assistance itself... can be said to implicate dignitary values like procedural fairness
and equality.").
53. See, eg., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 41-42 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (not-
ing that right to speedy trial serves to spare the accused of anxiety, lengthy pretrial incarcera-
tion, and stigma).
54. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07, 911 (1984) (noting that rule inter-
feres with truth-seeking function, but is justified where it serves to deter police wrongdoing);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484, 496 (1976) (same); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347, 349 (1974) (same).
55. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (essaying various non-
accuracy policies undergirding the privilege).
56. This strategy has been particularly prevalent in the right to counsel area, where the
Court has dismissed dignitary values associated with the right almost out of hand. See Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel generally requires demonstration of prejudice to the outcome of the trial); Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) (holding no constitutional violation when counsel refuses to
raise colorable claim on appeal that client insisted counsel advance so long as counsel's strate-
gic decision is reasonable); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (holding that Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between attorney and client),
57. The piece de resistance of the depreciation strategy is the harmless error doctrine,
which conditions the use of appellate review as a means of vindicating a constitutional right
upon a showing that accuracy values merit it. Emblematic of the doctrine's triumph is Ari-
zona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991), which renounced the constitutional gospel that
admission of a coerced confession could never be harmless error. Id. at 1266.
The depreciation strategy also is evident in the Court's speedy trial jurisprudence. See
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (applying balancing test in which accuracy con-
cerns predominate); H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72
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the costs and benefits of every effort to vindicate them may be carefully
scrutinized.5" The jurisprudence that results from these approaches con-
sistently tilts in favor of understatement and underenforcement of indi-
vidual rights.
The same bias heavily infects the methodology Justice Scalia un-
veiled in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 19 for determining whether a claimed
liberty interest merits substantive protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. A responsible inquiry, Justice Scalia rightly acknowledged,
requires consideration of relevant societal traditions.6' But which tradi-
tions are relevant to the inquiry? In a footnote "destined to take its place
among constitutional history's most provocative asides,"61 Justice Scalia
posited that the Court should "refer to the most specific level at which a
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right
can be identified."62 Whatever else may be said of this mode of historical
analysis,63 there can be no doubt that it systematically understates the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. While the most specific
COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1393 n.46, 1399-1400 (1972) (contending that Barker "unduly dispar-
ages the inchoate aspects of prejudice, virtually insisting upon proof by the accused of actual
demonstrable harm to his case," and concluding that the Court's analysis is not easily distin-
guished from an approach that would prevail under conventional due process analysis). Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence also appears to have been influenced by the strategy. See Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (denying Fifth Amendment protection to act of pro-
duction that is only marginally incriminating; government's need for documents, and its lack
of evidentiary interest in act of production itself, implicitly deemed to outweigh individual's
interests).
58. The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule has been made continually to pay its way
in this fashion. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (applying good faith excep-
tion to search conducted pursuant to unconstitutional statute); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil deportation proceed-
ing); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990-91 (1984) (applying good faith exception to
search conducted pursuant to flawed warrant); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)
(same); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (removing from scope of habeas corpus
claims based upon the exclusionary rule); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55
(1974) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury proceeding).
59. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 122-24.
61. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights,
57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1086 (1990).
62. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion).
63. Justice Scalia's mode of analysis gained only Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy pointedly disavowed it. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (noting methodology's inconsistency with precedent and its
tendency to foreclose flexibility needed to deal with the unanticipated). Justice Brennan
savaged it. Id. at 136-47, 156-57 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing methodology as unsupported by precedent, as a mask for subjective judg-
ments, and as conflating existence of liberty interest and issue of countervailing governmental
interests). Commentary has amplified the criticism. See, eg., Tribe & Doff, supra note 61, at
1086 (essaying various criticisms).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tradition favored by Scalia surely helps identify the range of individual
rights within the amendment's ambit, it is scarcely the exclusive histori-
cal indicium of constitutional significance. More generalized traditions
can also illuminate the inquiry, revealing dimensions of the concept of
liberty that a more specific tradition might obscure." By confining
judges to only the most specific traditions, Scalia's methodology seeks to
reduce the risk of erroneously subjective overstatements of the rights em-
braced by the Fourteenth Amendment. But in its pursuit of that objec-
tive, the methodology places those same rights at greater risk of
erroneous understatement by closing the judicial mind to constitutionally
relevant considerations.
Whether these and other conservative methodologies make for good
federal constitutional jurisprudence need not detain us here. The impor-
tant point is their unsuitability for the adjudication of state constitutional
questions. For one thing, the calculus that makes the methodologies
seem appealing to some people at the federal level depends upon struc-
tural considerations that operate with less force at the state level. The
erroneous overstatement of a state constitutional right is not nearly so
troublesome as a similar mistake under the Federal Constitution might
be because the former is bound to be less costly and more easily rectified
than the latter.65 In a state like North Carolina, however, an additional
and more fundamental reason exists for questioning such methodologies.
The state's constitutional framers foresaw that we might be tempted to
weaken our ardor for individual rights in the face of the perceived exigen-
cies of our day. They warned us to be vigilant and admonished us to
64. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion in Michael H., the Court
profited from its consideration of more general traditions in cases like Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94 (1987). Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
65. Overstatement of a federal constitutional right constrains the national political major-
ity and the political majorities of every state, and to the extent that it threatens to disrupt
social practices, it does so nationwide. Any harm done by the overstatement of a state consti-
tutional right, by contrast, is confined for the most part to the state in question.
Interpretive errors theoretically may be corrected by constitutional amendment, but the
procedure is considerably more cumbersome at the federal level than it is at the state level.
E.g., compare U.S. CONST. art. V (amendment requires ratification by three-fourths of the
states) with N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (amendment by legislative initiative, taking three-fifths
majority, and electoral ratification by simple majority). "[I]t is said that the Amending Clause
of the [Federal] Constitution has been employed to reverse the work of the Court only twice,
perhaps three times; and it has never been used to take away or diminish the Court's power."
BICKEL, supra note 36, at 21. Judicial overruling of an unsatisfactory precedent is clearly the
preferred method of correction. It would seem that claims of stare decisis are at least as pro-
nounced in theory at the federal level as at the state level-though perhaps no more pro-
nounced, see Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) ("Stare decisis is not an
inexorable command," but a principle of judicial policy.).
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resist when they mandated that our "frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty." If
nothing else, allegiance to the text and its spirit should make us wary of
compromising calculuses.66
IV. CONCLUSION
Needless to say, there is much more to the spirit of a state constitu-
tion than the zeal for individual rights manifested by a "frequent recur-
rence to fundamental principles" clause. An exhaustive study would
take into account the separation of powers67 and popular sovereignty
68 -
principles that surely ranked as fundamental in the minds of state consti-
tutional framers and which thus require constant attention and unfailing
respect in our constitutional affairs today.69 Considerable attention also
would have to be paid to other textual provisions which express impor-
tant insights about the nature and spirit of the document as a whole.70
66. Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff have argued in similar fashion that the Ninth
Amendment operates as a textual rule of construction that is antithetical to the restrictive
historical method advanced by Justice Scalia in Michael H. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 61, at
1100-01 ("Ninth Amendment... affirmatively acts as a presumption in favor of generalizing
at higher levels of abstraction"). Whatever the force of the argument under the Ninth Amend-
ment, the case seems easier to make under a provision which unequivocally mandates a "fre-
quent recurrence to fundamental principles."
67. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial
powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other."); Advi-
sory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 773-74, 295 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1982)
(discussing importance of separation of powers to the framers of state constitution). See gener-
ally John V. Orth, "Forever Separate and Distinct'" Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62
N.C. L. REv. 1, 3-10, 19-28 (1983) (discussing separation of powers under North Carolina
Constitution); Orth, supra note 27, at 1361-62 (same).
68. See, eg., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("All political power is vested in and derived from
the people; all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only,
and is instituted solely for the good of the whole."). See generally Orth, supra note 27, at 1360-
61, 1363-64 (discussing popular sovereignty under North Carolina Constitution).
69. Fashioning a jurisprudence of judicial review that gives separation of powers and pop-
ular sovereignty principles their fair measure at the same time that it safeguards individual
liberties against erosion is challenging, but not impossible. As the Supreme Court of North
Carolina recognized in State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940), once individual
rights are conceptualized as structural components of the democratic system---"foundation
stones" upon which the political "superstructure" is built-they can be reconciled with other
principles that underlie the political order. Id. at 763, 6 S.E.2d at 866. See supra text follow-
ing note 44.
70. The North Carolina Constitution, for instance, contains an equivalent of the Ninth
Amendment. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 36 ("The enumeration of rights in this Article shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people."). This provision could lend sup-
port to the rule of generous interpretation of individual rights derived from the "frequent
recurrence" clause. See supra note 66. Like the Ninth Amendment, § 36 also provides an
alluring textual basis for rooting an unenumerated fundamental right. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). But see supra note 48 and accompanying text (not-
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Work in that direction surely is to be encouraged.
Yet the simple lesson of this brief examination into constitutional
spirit is nonetheless sound and powerful. Judges who expound a state
constitution must do so with devotion to its spirit-not the spirit of the
Federal Constitution, and not the spirit that underlies the currently pop-
ular constitutional theory. In many states, North Carolina among them,
keeping faith with the constitutional spirit means interpreting individual
rights liberally and enforcing them unflinchingly.
ig reticence of courts to rely upon Ninth Amendment). The case for a body of unenumerated
fundamental rights is strengthened substantially by the very first provision of the Declaration
of Rights, which declares that all persons "are endowed by their Creator with certain inaliena-
ble rights"-"among" them (but not exclusively, it would seem, given the use of the word
"among") "life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of
happiness." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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